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ABSTRACT 
Social, and to a lesser extent, economic history have recently 
become so professionally popular and have made such inroads into political 
history that political history has not only been dethroned as the center 
of the discipline, but has had its very existence as a subject of 
independent inquiry threatened. Seeking to extend the range of political 
history to include the connection between electoral behavior and 
governmental policy by importing the "policy outputs" approach from 
political science, several recent works have accentuated this non­
political trend in political history. Reviewing the policy outputs 
literature and relating it to the sub-field of "spatial modeling" in 
political science, I attempt to point the way to a more complex and 
theoretical approach to the electorate-policy relationship, and by 
emphasizing the importance of institutional rules and candidate 
strategies, to inject politics back into political history. The 
approach is briefly applied to the politics of education in turn-of­
the-century North Carolina. 
If history ever was simply the study of past politics, it no 
longer is, Dissatisfied with narratives of Great Men, more interested 
in analyzing the impact of larger forces and in tracing out patterns 
of the lives of the masses of people, skeptical that a recounting of 
election campaigns and a counting of votes reveals much about social 
thought or action, strongly affected by currents of opinion which have 
long run deep in France, American historians have turned increasingly 
1 to social history. Others, perhaps those more comfortable with 
mathematics, have concentrated on economic history. Even most 
practitioners of the "new political history" have focused chiefly on 
the effect of social forces on politics or used votes as a measure of 
society' s opinions. 2 Political history is in danger of becoming a 
mere branch of social history. 
Yet this transformation has not gone unchallenged. Although 
"brought up on the idea that political history was obsolete and out·· of 
date," the French historian Jacques LeGoff contends that politics 
as the study of power may not be the "backbone of history," but 
should be its "nucleus.113 Critical as they are of 
quantitative studies, moreover, the Marxists Elisabeth Fox-Genovese 
and Eugene Genovese assert that history "is primarily the story of who 
rides whom and how" and insist therefore, that history is an "essentially 
4 political process. " Nor are social historians alone in their concern 
for the excluded political dimension. In his recent presidential 
address to the Economic History Association, Lance E. Davis warns his 
2 
colleagues that "if we are to understand economic history we must be 
able to understand and to explain the behavior of the government sector, " 
And, reflecting the emphasis on theory which has been so central a part 
of the training and practice of economic historians, Davis highlights 
the "potential for successful collaboration between political history 
5 and theory. " 
If they have not yet resigned themselves to the annihilation 
of political history seemingly favored by some social historians, or 
adopted the subordinate roles implicit in the redirection of the aims 
of political history promoted by the imperialists from social and 
economic history, political historians have been reshaping and extending 
their own territory. Paralleling developments in political science, the 
new agenda for political history now spans the whole political process 
from the expression of the society's underlying socio-economic divisions 
in elections to the formation of policies by elected and appointed 
officials and the delineation of the consequences of those policies for 
6 the society. Historians have also recently laid a good deal of stress 
on the effect of institutional rules in shaping candidate strategies, 
electoral results, and policy choice, What is new about these emerging 
trends in the political history literature is the rediscovery of the 
importance of electoral rules and the initiation of an effort to 
connect policy to the behavior of voters and candidates. 7 Since 
political scientists have been studying these particular problems for 
much longer than political historians have, what can we learn from them? 
In the Balkanized discipline of political science, the two 
sub-fields most closely related to the electoral politics-po1icy link 
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and the problem of institutional rules do not border on each other and 
rarely trade, The first, spatial models of party or candidate 
competition, is at the extreme abstract or theoretical end of political 
science, while the second, the policy outputs area, is an intellectual 
continent away, in deepest empiricism. Although historians seem as 
yet largely unaware of the existence of spatial models, some have 
scouted the policy outputs territory. The initial explorers have been 
too quick to accept that state' s deterministic, anti-political orthodoxy. 
Richard L. McCormick, for instance, has recently applied the policy output 
political scientists' finding that both electoral behavior and policy 
formation were, in McCormick' s words, "fundamentally shaped not by one 
another but jointly by factors beyond politics" in a suggestive overview 
8 of nineteenth-century American politics, A reconnoitering of the spatial 
modeling terrain and its relationship to the policy outputs region 
however, may suggest other, more complex insights and point political 
history, as Lance Davis has advocated, in the direction of more 
self-conscious and systematic theorizing. 
The policy outputs literature, like so much else in political 
science, begins with V. o. Key, Jr, In his classic Southern Politics, 
Key combined values, theory, and speculation to make a set of famous 
and influential remarks : 
Politics generally comes down, over the long run, to 
a conflict between those who have and those who have 
less. In state politics the crucial issues tend to 
turn around taxation and expenditure. What level of 
public education and what levels of other public 
services shall be maintained? How shall the burden 
of taxation for their support be distributed? , , , 
It follows that the grand objective of the haves is 
obstruction, at least of the haves who take only a 
short-term view. Organization is not always neces-
sary to obstruct; it is essential, however, for the 
promotion of a sustained program in behalf of the 
have-nots, , , It follows, if these propositions 
are correct, that over the long run the have-nots 
lose in a disorganized politics . .  , • 
Noting also that the have-nots in the South were often disfranchised 
by law, practice, or habit, Key concluded that the one-party 
factionalism of the South in that period produced an 11issueless 
politics," an unhealthy social system, and a starved set of public 
services for the masses. 9 
Essentially dormant for some years after 1949, the seeds 
planted by Key' s statement burst forth in 1963, and soon quantitative 
comparisons of expenditures and other outputs of government across 
cities, states, and nations had threatened to take over the whole 
field of political science, The basic framework of the vast majority 
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of these works is simple enough to outline, for they have no theory --
they have systems analysis. 
Basically, the framework consists of labeled black boxes 
connected with directional arrows, most simply something like this: 
Environmental 
Factors 
(Demand,Capability) 
Political Inputs 
(Turnout, 
Competition, Etc. ) 
Policy 
Outputs 
( $ ) 
5 
The first studies generally read Key as saying that political 
inputs produced policy, and showed that that link was spurious, since 
the simple produce-moment correlation coefficients between inputs and 
outputs across the American states in a post-World War II cross-section 
went to insignificance when one partialled out the effects of such 
bakcground variables as per capita income, urbanization, and industrial­
ization. 10 More recent studies have seemingly settled on path analysis, 
or non-linear variations of that hierarchical system of regression 
equations, to make similar findings on city, state, and national data 
sets. 11 Dependent policy variables have ranged from highway or 
recreational expenditures per capita to welfare expenditures, indices 
of policy innovation, measures of the redistributiveness of taxation 
and expenditure systems, and proxies for the actual impact of various 
policies. The vast majority of the studies have been cross-sectional 
and have focused on recent statistics. 12 Although there have been a 
good many dissenters, the basic finding of most studies has been that 
mass politics seems to make little difference in policy formation, In 
fact, one recent literature review summed up the findings of the field 
by claiming that "electoral politics does not control the structure of 
expenditures and taxation, legislator voting patterns, or legislative 
policy. 1113 
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Before accepting this elitist and anti-institutional counsel 
of political despair, let us look a bit more closely at the policy 
outputs literature. I am not wholly convinced by its chief finding for 
five reasons. First, a point which occurs immediately to a historian: 
Nearly all of the studies are time-bound, concentrated in the post-War 
period when the polity and policies of America, and indeed, the developed 
world, were becoming increasingly centralized and similar. Because of 
the growing policy emulation and central control across areas, and 
because of the increasing homogenization of political behavior, there 
just isn ' t  that much variance in the dependent variable to be explained, 
nor terribly much variance in the independent political variables with 
14 which to explain anything. 
The recency of the data suggests a second point. As the 
incrementalist school of policy analysis reminds us again and again, 
many policy areas have become so bureaucratized in the post-War period 
that there simply isn't enough "play" in these subsystems for electoral 
politics to have very great effects. Bureaucrats do make policy over a 
15 large range of well-established programs. And since much of any 
agency ' s  budget goes for salaries, and few politicians can really face 
up to throwing large numbers of government employees out of work, one 
shouldn ' t  expect electoral politics to have a great short-range impact 
on such programs. Where we should expect an impact is in previously 
unbureaucratized areas, or in periods before the bureaucratic thicket 
became so dense, In North Carolina in the period from 1880 to 1901, to 
take an instance to be more fully developed later in this article, the 
total state education bureaucracy consisted of an underpaid superin-
tendent and a half-time clerk. Education committees in the legislature 
turned over almost entirely with every election , which prevented the 
development of cosy legislative-bureaucratic arrangements. Interest 
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groups of teachers and local administrators were just getting started. 
In such a simple environment , the translation of political desire into 
policy could be swift and straightforward. 
A third general criticism is that the studies typically use 
16 cross-sectional data or data from a relatively short time series. The 
problem with cross-sectional data is that all geographic units may be sub-
ject to the same fundamental trends, that , for example , inflation or recession 
may force nearly all governments to f ollow similar policies at the same time , 
since at any time they are likely to share a common conventional economic 
wisdom about cutting· or expanding budgets to counteract fluctuations in 
the economy. Moreover , short developmental sequences may disguise 
major policy shifts , which often take a fairly long time to effectuate. 
Fourth , the policy output studies have sacrificed specificity 
for breadth of coverage , and more detailed studies may yield different 
conclusions. Suppose one found no correlation between party competition 
or turnout and , say , welfare support levels across time or space. Then 
it might be correct to conclude that politics made "no difference" in 
outcomes. But there are other alternatives. It might be that welfare 
did not appear prominently on the political agenda , a fact which a closer 
17 look at the election campaigns would disclose. If so , there would be 
no demands to be translated into policy , and the negligible correlation 
would be easily explained. Or it could be that many voters wished to 
cut taxes rather than raise welfare levels , or that the cutters and 
spenders more or less balanced each other out , in which case , again , 
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18 the lack of political and policy correlation should be expected. 
The point is that mass demands for policy changes are inadequately 
represented in the policy outputs literature. Sometimes the socio-
economic background variables are treated as demands ,  sometimes as 
19 merely reflecting the capability of financing policies. More 
detailed studies and better proxies for demands might change the 
20findings dramatically. 
To illustrate the point about the potential importance of 
close studies , let me draw an example again from late nineteenth 
century North Carolina. The correlation across counties between 
property value per white family and expenditures per white student 
for seven cross-sections from 1880 to 1910 was quite high , high enough 
to swamp the effects of nearly every other independent variable which 
could be entered into a set of regression equations. Although at 
first , I thought this finding supported those of the economic deter-
minists in the policy outputs field , a closer look at the laws and 
constitution of the state disclosed the presence of a law , in effect 
from 1871 to the 1920s in the state, which set one statewide property 
tax rate , but directed that all taxes were to be spent in the county 
where they were collected. Further , a series of state court decisions 
virtually prohibited local taxation until 1905. The relation between 
wealth and expenditures therefore should be interpreted for this data 
set as showing not the weakness of the effect of political inputs on 
policy , but the strength of that impact. Before 1871 and for a time 
after 1933, state education revenues were collected centrally and 
distributed to the counties in proportion to the number of educable 
9 
children -- a completely egalitarian system. The reactionary Democrats 
who took control of North Carolina in a Ku Klux Klan coup d'etat in 1870, 
however, imposed an inegalitarian system of the state, which lasted 
for a half-century. The political underpinning of the artificially 
induced correlation between wealth and spending would be missed by an 
21 analyst who merely crunched the quantitative data. 
My fifth and final criticism of the policy outputs literature 
22 is that it lacks any microtheoretical structure. No individual people 
inhabit its black boxes; no human motives travel its causal arrows; 
no one, neither leaders nor followers, really acts. To employ systems 
analysis in social science is to mistake metaphor for theory. Along 
with its sociological sibling, structural-functionalism, systems analysis 
is the passive voice of social science. 
From a social scientific field characterized by data without 
theory, we now turn to one consisting of theory without data, the study 
of spatial models of party competition. As befits a subject which is a 
bastard child of economics and political science, spatial models is of 
uncertain parentage. Were there a paternity suit, the most likely 
prosecutees would be Harold Hotelling for his work on the spatial 
location of businesses, Kenneth Arrow for his on social choice, and 
Duncan Black for his on committees. The midwife is less in dispute, the 
23 obvious choice being Anthony Downs. 
Spatial models generally appear in the guise of one-dimensional 
frequency distributions of public opinion on an issue or set of issues, 
most familiarly a symmetric unimodal distribution in which two parties 
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compete for the franchises of voters, who decide for whom to vote on 
the basis of the distance between their preferences and the issue 
positions of the candidates. The model has a vector representation for 
multi-dimensional space, and theorums can be rigorously proved by 
symbolic logic, linear algebra, or game theory. Much of the early work 
consisted of trying to determine market-like equilibria or core 
solutions, and the best-known result was that under certain conditions, 
both parties converged to the position of the median voter. 
Now, there are three problems with trying to apply the formal 
results of spatial models to policy analysis. First, the assumptions 
necessary to derive these results are violated by common observations 
in political science. For instance, all voters must at least roughly 
agree on the weights to be attached to each issue and on where each 
candidate stands; the candidates must take clear issue positions; and 
24 voter preferences cannot be changed by experiences during a campaign. 
The second problem is that even if we suspend disbelief on these assump-
tions, it can be shown that an equilibrium does not exist if there are 
more than two candidates or if voters abstain because of "alienation" --
that is, if they decide that neither candidate is sufficiently close to 
25 them that it is worthwhile to trudge to the polls. Third, even if we 
had equilibria in these interesting and important cases, the elected 
politicians might not carry out their announced policies, either because 
the rules of the policy game robbed them of power to deliver; or because 
they were incompetent; or because they changed their minds once in 
office; or, most simply, because they lied during the campaign. As a 
result of all these problems, it appears that the most recent work in the 
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field, much of it experimental rather than mathematically deductive, 
has aimed at developing new and weaker solution concepts which will 
not absolutely guarantee the adoption of particular policy positions, 
but will be close enough, as one article has it, "for all practical 
26 purposes." 
These difficulties notwithstanding, I think that some of the 
underlying ideas of spatial models can be profitably employed in an 
informal and heuristic fashion to illuminate some of the competing 
theories in the field of policy outputs. Figure 1 is an attempt to 
turn Key's verbal model into a geometric spatial model. The horizontal 
axis, here and in subsequent figures, indexes the level of redistribution 
desired by each voter, and the vertical, the proportion of voters whose 
ideal point falls at any particular place on the one-dimensional "left"-. 
"right" continuum. There are no restrictions on voting, there is two­
party competition, and both parties are assumed to keep their promises. 
The distribution of opinion is bimodal, and the left mode is higher than 
the right because there are more have-nots than haves. Allowing voters 
to abstain because of either alienation or indifference, and assuming 
away the problems of incomplete or· fuzzy information, poorly behaved 
preference functions, and disagreement on issue weighting, we intuitively 
expect to observe the two parties both taking issue positions pretty 
close to the mean or median, say, at P1 and P2. The governmental policies 
adopted should thus be fairly redistributive, as Key predicted. 
Figure 1 here 
Let me make three observations about this example. For the 
median result to hold, we must as sume that all issues which have 
marked redistributive overtones can be collapsed into one dimension. 
Most importantly, taxation and expenditure decisions must be made 
simultaneously; otherwise, it would be perfectly reasonable, for 
example, for a voter who, ceteris paribus, prefers more spending on 
welfare, but who is presented with a regressive and unchangeable tax 
system, to vote against a candidate who agrees with him on welfare 
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but who feels that the existing structure of taxation cannot be amended, 
at least in the immediate future. Furthermore, a voter who prefers 
redistributive expenditures on welfare must not, if the median result 
is to hold for all subject areas, prefer a non-redistributive pattern 
of educational spending; if he holds these two positions simultaneously, 
the analyst must disentangle the issues from each other, and such 
disentanglement may confuse the relationship of each issue to the 
progressivity of the tax system. Second, the result might not hold if 
a lot of voters perceived the issue complex as not salient, or if they 
were too attached to a party or a candidate for these issues to make 
much difference. Third, this model assumes honest parties. Suppose, for 
example, the competing elites shared certain ideological presuppositions 
or all craved approval from the Establishment or all sought to raise 
campaign funds from people.whose ideal points fell in the right-hand mode 
by satisfying the donors ' policy desires. Then Figure 1 might turn into 
Figure 2, where the C's subscript the politicians' campaign promises and 
the G ' s, the policies actually adopted when they formed a government. 
If the true experience is represented by Figure 2, which might fairly 
aptly summarize the situation in parts of the United States just before 
the rise of the Populists or that in Great Britain when the Labour Party 
was in its infancy, then one would expect either the rise of a leftist 
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party, or a takeover of one of the two parties by a leftist -- for 
instance, McGovern in 197 2, or an attempt to exclude leftist parties 
from competing -- for example, the Red Scares of 1918-1920 or the late 
1940s in America. In the first two cases at least, the polity would 
probably eventually return to policies which pleased the median voter, 
but there could be a considerable time lag, and a cross-sectional 
study taken during the lag might well conclude that there was no 
relation between competition and outputs. Since one way the lower 
class could guarantee that there was no divergence between promises 
and policy would be to select as leaders only those who were ideologi­
cally committed to the class's goals, a socialist party might be their 
best guarantee of a continuation of redistributive policies. 
Figure 2 here 
Indeed, though Key sometimes spoke of parties as sets of 
competing elites interested only in maximizing pluralities, as the 
spatial modelers also assume, he hinted from time to time that he 
believed the "have�nots" needed a genuinely lower-class party in o·tder 
to sustain a redistributive program. (Since he did not make the point 
explicit, he never had to come to grips with Michels. ) 28 Perhaps the
unkept promises point, which seems to me to raise serious problems for 
spatial competition analysis of policy, led Key to mix his "elite 
competition" and "lower-class party" notions. In any case, the two 
variants would lead to quite different predictions about the relations 
between political inputs and outputs. If the proletariat can trust its 
leaders, party competition and substantial lower-class turnout may, 
other things equal, lead to redistribution. If leaders can't or won't 
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keep their pledges, then redistribution will be likely to occur only if 
the lower class provides its own leadership -- and then watches its 
every move. 
Key probably would have modeled the 1900-50 Southern political 
system as in Figure 3, where the dotted lines indicate the disfranchised 
voters and there is so little continuity from election to election in 
factional lineups in the multi-candidate Democratic primaries that one 
cannot really tell where each candidate will fall or how many candidates 
there will be. Since a candidate who promised a major extension of 
services for the disfranchised, such as most blacks in the South from 
1900 to about 1950, could expect swift retaliation by the voters, the 
policies advocated would fall in the right-hand hump. But since the 
factionalism, at least in the early twentieth century South, was quite 
fluid and since there could be multiple candidates, the winner could 
choose a platform anywhere on that mode. And because the lack of 
factional continuity from election to election would decrease the voters' 
ability to punish candidates who failed to keep their promises, the 
policies eventually adopted might well stray quite far from the promises 
made, perhaps even stray into the left half of the redistribution scale. 
As a consequence, one should expect that a shift from a Figure 1 to a 
Figure 3 polity would, other things equal, not only decrease the 
redistributiveness of the policies adopted, but also pronouncedly 
increase the amount of variance in those policies. 
Figure 3 here 
Figure 4 represents a political system with the same distribu­
tion of opinion on issues of redistribution as Key hypothesized, and 
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no restrictions on voting, but where the number of parties or candidates 
is indeterminant and the policies eventually adopted could fall anywhere 
on the line. The curves are dotted to reflect the fact that in this 
case, public opinion and policy are disconnected. This graph might 
represent any of four situations. First, the issue might not be salient 
in voter decisions, perhaps because of a general belief that government 
29 should not intervene in behalf of any particular class. Thus, on the 
line of redistribution the coordinate of the policy adopted would be an 
unintended consequence of stands taken on other issues. 
Figure 4 here 
Second, there might be multi-candidate competition, in which 
case any candidate placing himself, say, on the left mode could always 
be outflanked on both sides, and, therefore, since no particular 
strategy would insure success, the policy espoused by the winner could 
30 lie virtually anywhere along the line. The same effect could be 
achieved in a two-party state 1f voters closely observed the candidates' 
positions and abstained even if only slightly displeased with the issue 
stands the closest politician tocik. 
Third, open competition might not be allowed, as in Communist 
countries, and the policies would be determined by other factors. If 
the party in power were ideologically committed to leftist policies, 
as most Communist parties are, the policies would generally be leftist; 
or, if the party were of the opposite ideological persuasion, as is the 
Chilean junta, for instance, the policies would be rightist. This 
observation shows that party competition is not a necessary prerequisite 
of redistributive policies and explains the finding of some cross-national 
studies31 that Communist and non-Communist countries have adopted 
similar welfare policies; but it suggests also that the variance in 
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policies adopted by Figure 4 polities should be greater than those of 
Figure 1 countries. 
Fourth, suppose that for some reason, perhaps one of those 
just enumerated, bureaucrats or interest groups rather than voter-
oriented politicians made the crucial policy decisions, Then regardless 
of the distribution of public opinion or the amount of turnout or the 
nature of party competition, the policies could fall anywhere on the 
line. Policy would then vary with the tastes of bureaucrats or the 
comparative strength of various interest groups, and one would expect, 
for example, that a disproportionate rise in labor union strength would 
cause a polity to shift to the left, while a similar growth of organi-
32 zation among big businesses would signal a rightward trend. The 
growth of the bureaucratic state, on the other hand, would shield policy 
determination from public opinion, a. consideration which suggests that 
we should search for direct connections between politics and policies 
in areas where bureaucratic domination is weakest, where functionaries 
have the least independent power, or at a time before they became 
entrenched. 
While the informal discussion of bimodal models has suggested 
explanations for various findings in the policy outputs literature and 
prescriptions for future studies, we should not hastily assume a 
bimodal distribution of public opinion. After all, one of the problems 
with policy output studies noted earlier is that in most cases we have 
no direct measures of demands. What if the distribution were unimodal? 
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Figure 5 represents the most-studied case in spatial modeling , a 
symmetric unimodal distribution in which two-party competition drives 
both parties to adopt the position of the median voter. 
Figure 5 here 
Suppose , however , ·that one of the parties is too weak , because 
of historic party identification or some other reason, to pose a real 
threat to the other. Then the majority party could take any position 
on the line, though a risk-averse party might feel constrained not to 
wander too far from the median , as indicated by the dashed lines in 
Figure 6. 33 The risk-averse majority (PMR) locates between the dashed 
lines , while the gambling parties (PGLand PGR) take positions to the 
left and right of the spectrum. If we compared Figure 5 to Figure 6 
polities , in other words, we might find them adopting fairly similar 
policies on the average , but we would expect much more dispersion in 
the choices of the latter than the former. 
Figure 6 here 
Consider further a shift from Figure 5 to Figure 7, which , 
paralleling the change from Figure 1 to Figure 3, represents the 
disfranchisement of the lower classes and the ending of organized party 
competition. As in the earlier discussion ,  we would expect the policies 
adopted by the regimes after the change to be both less redistributive , 
although perhaps not as much less as in the bimodal case , and less 
predictable than those of the administrations before the change. 
Figure 7 here 
But suppose we found that policies did not vary systematically 
across systems which diverged widely on measures of turnout and party 
competition? Then either we would be back in the unstable case of 
Figure 2 ,  or the more stable one of Figure 4, allowing unimodal 
distributions with side-conditions analogous to the bimodal case in 
each , or we would have to hypothesize a set of much narrower , more 
sharply peaked distributions , as in Figure 8. For it is two-party 
competition which drives policy to the center in Figures 1 and 5; 
without that competition ,  societies with bimodal or broad unimodal 
18 
distributions would almost certainly experience greater policy variance , 
as in Figures 3, 6, or 7.  Only with a distribution like Figure 8 would 
one expect all candidates to bunch around the modal point regardless 
of the degree of competition or the number of candidates. 
Figure 8 here 
Distributions such as Figure 8 appear to capture what members 
of the "social determinist" school of policy outputs have in mind when 
they consider socioeconomic variables as indicators of demands , instead 
of resource availability. If their contentions can be extended to issues 
34 of redistribution , which they are somewhat loathe to do the implication 
is that each type of society is characterized by a firm policy consensus. 
Less "developed" states or countries have either less taste for 
redistributive policies than their more fortunate counterparts , or are 
less able to indulge their desires. If the contrast in policies adopted 
is determined largely by such differences in tastes , then Figure 9 might 
adequately represent public opinion in two polar cases. In each of the 
two states , which appear on the same graph for convenience , the public 
overwhelmingly agrees on policies , and any candidate would be irrational 
to stray to a position on the line not under the closed umbrella of 
19 
consensus, If a polity in which opinion was distributed as in Figure 8 
disfranchised a segment of the populus or ended party competition , 
35 policy would not change , for only the height of the mode would diminish. 
Figure 9 here 
All nine of the figures that I have presented probably apply 
to some issues in some locations at some times, The problem is that 
·since we often lack direct measures of demand , not to mention an appro-
priate metric , we can seldom apply any one of them with perfect confidence. 
We should , however , try to step back and consider which might be most
appropriate in a given circumstance , and , if we can come to no conclusion 
by mere logic , attempt to determine how we can go about testing one
against the other in any particular situation, The attractiveness of Key's 
models (Figures 1�3) is that they follow from the assumption of rational 
self-interest on the part of voters and politicians and his observation
of a markedly skewed income distribution. If the horizontal axis is 
changed to another group of issues , it may be more difficult to specify 
the assumptions required to produce a particular distribution of opinion
or set of political combatants. If , after considerable thought on the
part of the data analyst , no distributions or strategies appear more
likely than any others , that very fact may imply that it would be 
unreasonable to expect to observe a connection between policies and the 
political process on such a set of issues. 
I can best illustrate how the observations which I have made 
about the policy outputs and spatial modeling literature can be applied 
by discussing my current project on Southern education from 1880 to 1910. 
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My study is designed to overcome six problems of previous analyses of 
policy outputs. First , the direct effects of educational benefits , 
unlike , for example , many of the direct effects of highways , recreational 
expenditures ,  or national defense , are relatively easily divisible , 
easily assignable to particular persons or groups. It makes sense to 
talk about the distribution of the benefits of educational spending; 
whereas , it is much more difficult to divvy up the shares of purer 
public goods. 
Second , the distributional issue , while of varying importance 
from campaign to campaign , was clearly central throughout the period, 
When Radical Republican governments assumed power during Reconstruction , 
practically the first thing they did was to set up public school systems; 
and both their educational programs and rhetoric were suffused with 
36 egalitarian sentiments. When Redeemer governments , dominated by 
wealthy Democrats , and often , as in Texas and Mississippi , for instance , 
spearheaded by tax-cutting movements , took over from the Radicals , they 
reduced general spending levels for education , thereby punishing most 
37 those who could not afford private schools, In other states , such as
North Carolina , the Redeemers combined overall spending cuts and tax 
limitations with decentralization of finance and control , thereby 
mandating malapportionment of schooling. The movements at the beginning 
of the century for increased local taxation and legislative acts which 
enabled the multiplication of special taxing districts which segregated 
wealthy from poor areas were self-consciously elitist , and succeeded 
only over the repeated and vehement protests of those who wished to 
38 spread educational opportunity equally. Specific facts aside , 
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education, which consumed thirty to fifty percent of Southern state 
budgets, and was widely believed around the turn of the century to be 
the key to societal progress and equality of opportunity, was an issue 
which must have been extremely salient to most voters. 
Third, the issue is one to which a calculus of simple self-
interest seems obviously appropriate. From time to time public policy 
analysts have tried to match public opinion and policy on such issues 
39 as lotteries or the death penalty. These studies may be possible 
when one has adequate survey data, but scientific surveys only began 
in 1935, and few analysts can hope to make use of an extended time 
series of surveys on important policy issues, at least below the 
national level. In such cases, one is forced to hypothesize about the 
shape of public opinion on an issue, subject to whatever approximate 
tests of the assumptions are available, and therefore it is helpful to 
choose policy areas in which relatively simple hypotheses seem adequate. 
Fourth, by concentrating on the period from 1880 to 1910, one 
escapes the homogenized world of the present, and has a long enough 
time series to observe major alterations in policy. The period largely 
precedes the development of potent bureaucracies and scholastic interest 
groups, at least in the South, and one may therefore avoid having to 
disentangle the impact of these groups on policy. 
Fifth, the data set, essentially all the counties of the eleven 
ex-Confederate states, with the statistics often separated by race, is 
large and diverse enough to provide an adequate amount of variance in 
both potential independent and dependent variables, while the general 
topic is small enough and the secondary literature rich enough to enable 
a diligent researcher to uncover many crucial details which someone 
studying, say, all countries in the developed world, would probably 
miss. 
Finally, there are at least three ways to try to determine, 
at least in a gross sense, the shape of public opinion on the issue. 
Models of individual behavior are therefore possible, at least in 
principle. First of all, there are a few statewide referenda on 
distribution-related issues. In 1882, for instance, Kentucky, which 
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did not really secede, but which has always been at least "romantically" 
Southern, held a referendum on whether to increase the white property 
tax rate by 10 percent in order to triple school expenditures for blacks, 
thereby equalizing state-level expenditures for both races. The 
correlates of voting patterns on this proposal tell us a good deal 
about the opinions on black education of voters with various charac­
teristics. 40 
A second way to approximate demand is to look at variations 
in local tax rates, Those areas which had higher tax rates must have 
been willing to pay a larger proportion of their incomes for the 
education of their children than those in low-tax areas, other things 
equal. If the taxes were highest where the people were poorest, which 
was overwhelmingly the case in North Carolina, for instance, then it 
is but a short step to conclude that the poor, black and white, had a 
strong demand for redistribution through taxes and spending, while the 
wealthy, nearly all white, were content to finance their own schools 
at their current low tax rates without increasing their subsidy to the 
children of the less fortunate. 41 
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A third way to learn something about opinion on redistribution 
is to look at the actions of state legislators in key sessions. In 1870 
in North Carolina, for instance, legislators from rich counties 
generally supported the shift from a statewide to a county-wide 
collection and disbursement of funds. In 1883 in North Carolina, in 
1886 in Alabama, and at other times in other states, legislatures 
passed laws allowing local school boards to discriminate against blacks 
42 in the allocation of funds within counties or districts. Although 
I have not yet studied these cases in detail, their analysis should 
reveal a good deal about attitudes toward inequality of educational 
opportunity for blacks. 
A related issue considered by several Southern legislators 
and constitutional conventions suggested one measure for the distribution 
of educational benefits. In the late 1860s and early 70s, and again 
after blacks were substantially disfranchised about 1900, there were 
widespread calls, especially from wealthy white Democrats, for the 
passage of laws or constitutional amendments denying funds raised from 
taxes on whites to black education. Since blacks were almost unanimously 
poor, confining their schools to the relative pittances which could be 
raised from taxes on the race meant consigning their schools to severe 
and permanent inferiority. Because such blatant discrimination might 
inflame northern public opinion, or be invalidated by the courts, and 
because less obvious, but. equally effective means of discrimination 
existed, none of these laws passed. 
These proposals suggested the following index of racial 
discrimination over time. For a few states where data on taxes and 
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spending is available by race for the whole period, I determined the 
proportion of expenditures which went to blacks and the proportion of 
direct taxes paid by blacks. I call this index the "black balance of 
payments" and present the statewide trends for North Carolina in table 
1, which is based on data collected for each of the thirty years and 
averaged over five-year periods in order to equalize the numbers of 
observations for each period and to smooth out the impact of non­
recurring expenses for school construction.
43 
Table 1 here 
The trend in the table is clear enough. The level of white 
subsidy to black education was roughly constant from 1880 to 1900, 
when the state passed a law which disfranchised at least 95 percent of 
the blacks. The subsidy immediately dropped to about half the pre-1900 
level, and fell off by another 20-25 percent in the last part of the 
period. 
Even more interesting is the shift in the correlates of the 
black balance of payments over time. Table 2 presents OLS regression 
coefficients for county-level data in North Carolina. A wide assortment 
of variables were initially included in the regression equations, and 
I eliminated those which had no significant coefficients. Removal of 
the extraneous terms left the remaining parameter estimates virtually 
unaffected. The pattern of coefficients for the percentage Negro 
variable is the most striking· facet of the table -- strongly positive 
coefficients until 1900, weakly positive for the five-year period 
immediately after disfranchisement, and negative, though not significant, 
coefficients in the final half-decade. 
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Table 2 here 
My gloss on this pattern is that while blacks enjoyed the 
vote, they were able to use their political power to extract a larger 
subsidy from whites in counties where there were a great many black 
votes, despite the fact that it was precisely in those counties where 
white racism and the plantation economy's hierarchic socioeconomic 
structure were strongest. After disfranchisement, black votes lost 
their value as currency negotiable for government benefits. 
It seems unlikely that this marked distributional shift merely 
reflected some underlying socioeconomic upheaval, for, first, the 
correlation between the black payments account and the wealth per white 
male adule stayed pretty constant and insignificant through the era. 
Second, the economy improved markedly after 1900. The statewide value 
of real and personal property per white male adult, which had varied 
from $875 in the early eighties to $798 in the still depressed late 
nineties, jumped to $904 and $1,094 in the last two periods. The 37 
percent rise in property value in a decade meant that the state was 
capable of distributing a larger amount to its poor after 1900 than 
before; instead, it gave a markedly lower percentage of available funds 
to blacks, which decreased the relative standing of black vis-a-vis 
white schools, and therefore made the black opportunity to progress 
through schooling growingly· unequal. And the perfect correlation in 
time between disfranchisement and the diminution of the black balance 
of payments strongly suggests that politics made all the difference. 
Although it would be possible to present further numbers 
making essentially the same point through different means, the major 
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conclusions are clear.44 In turn-of-the-century Southern education, 
figures 1 and 3 sketch the before and after pictures pretty well. The 
decisive factor in the shift in the distribution of expenditures and 
taxes from one which favored blacks to one which left them approximately 
as badly off as under the social status quo was political, not social 
or economic. 
The findings of the policy outputs studies should not 
disturb believers in democracy quite as much as they have. Rather, by 
providing a better grounding in individual behavior and by choosing 
data sets carefully, we can begin to specify the conditions under which 
mass politics will make a difference in policy. Such a deeper under­
standing should lead to the construction of more fully articulated and 
complex models of the process of policymaking in different areas at 
different times and strengthen the relationship between sophisticated 
techniques and sophisticated theory. And in giving institutional rules 
and candidate strategies a prominent place in the theoretical structure, 
we will be restoring politics to the central place it deserves to hold 
in political history. 
TABLE l 
STATEWIDE TRENDS IN THE "BLACK BALANCE OF PAYMENTS," 1880-1910 
Period Balance* Period Balance* 
1880-1884 . 205 1896-1900 . 189 
1886-1890 . 177 1901-1905 . 097 
1891-1895 .174 1906-19!1,0 . 057 
*Black proportion of expenditures minus black proportion of 
property and poll taxes.
TABLE 2 
THE SHIFTING CORRELATES OF THE BLACK BALANCE 
OF PAYMENTS -- MULTIPLE REGRESSION STATISTICS 
Percent Percent White Wealth 
Period Negro Negro2 (in $1000) Constant 
1880-1884 + 0.54* - 0.33* + 0.05* - . 02 
1885-1890 + 1. 02* - 1.15* + 0.02 - . 04 
1891-1895 + 0. 85* - 0. 87* + 0.02 - . 02 
1896-1900 + 0. 85* - 0. 85* + 0. 01 - . 02 
1901-1905 + 0.32* - 0.40* + 0. 09 - . 04 
1906-1910 - 0.08 - 0.01 + 0. 06 + . 01 
R2 
,86* 
• 75ic 
• 74*
. 69* 
. 53* 
. 11 
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FIGURE 10 
LORENTZ CURVE ILLUSTRATING THE IMPACT OF DISFRANCHISEMENT ON THE DEGREE 
TO WHICH EDUCATION WAS REDISTRIBUTIVE IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1880-1910 (BOTH RACES) 
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